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ARTICLE  
 
Do Water Law and Policy Promote 
Sustainable Water Use? 
DAN TARLOCK∗
 
 
I. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A BENCHMARK 
NORM? 
Sustainable development, contested as it is, has emerged as 
both an international policy objective and a legal principle1 
against which resource exploitation and use can be measured.  
The core idea of sustainable development is that resources should 
be used to both serve the needs of present and future 
generations.2
 
∗ Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law and 
Honorary Professor UNESCO Centre for Water Law, Policy, and Science, 
University of Dundee, Scotland.  I wish to thank Mr. Paul Lee, J.D. candidate, 
Pace University School of Law, for his helpful research assistance. 
  This requires that extraction, production and 
consumptive patterns integrate economic development and 
environmental protection and be socially inclusive.  This article 
 1. A legal principle has been defined as a legal norm which “provides the 
general orientation and direction to which positive law must conform, a 
rationale for the law, without itself constituting a binding norm,” as opposed to 
“rules of indeterminate content, having a degree of abstraction so great that it is 
not possible to deduce obligations from them with any degree of certainty.” 
ALEXANDRE C. KISS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 203 
(3d ed. 2004). 
 2. United Nations Conference On Environment and Development, Rio de 
Janiero, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, Principle 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I 
(Aug. 12, 1992).  All definitions derive from the World Comm’n on Env’t and 
Dev., Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our 
Common Future 43, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (1987), available at 
http://www.undemocracy.com/A-42-427.pdf.  Edith Brown Weiss’ book is the 
foundation of legal norms to implement the principle. See generally EDITH 
BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1989). 
1
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asks whether the principle of sustainable development is a useful 
lens with which to evaluate United States water law and policy.  
My basic argument is that water law and policy have some 
capacity to promote more sustainable use patterns and that the 
careful use of “sustainable” as a label can move law and policy in 
this direction.  The promotion of sustainable use is necessary 
because too many laws and policies provide deeply embedded 
incentives for immediate resource consumption that often reflects 
a small percentage of the total social cost of consumption and 
offer few, if any, incentives for alternative, more sustainable 
exploitation and consumption options. 
Water law has always contained the core elements of 
sustainable development, although the label has not been used to 
describe them.  The law has had an inter-generational 
perspective, if only because users will only invest in 
infrastructure if long-term future supplies are secure.  It has also 
tried to ensure that renewable supplies are used relatively 
efficiently and that non-renewable groundwater supplies are not 
recklessly mined.  Sustainable development has an important 
inclusion or social justice component, and water law has had to 
face the challenges of accommodating multiple demands, 
including new, often socially marginal, uses such as Native 
American claims and environmental protection.  Finally, the law 
has had to adjust to changed conditions such as Global Climate 
Disruption [hereinafter “GCD”], which threaten future supplies.3
 
 3. Error! Main Document Only.The term seems have originated in a 
2007 Harvard lecture by Professor John P. Holdren, now the White House 
Science Advisor.  See John P. Holdren, Presentation at John F. Kennedy School 
of Government Forum: Global Climate Disruption: What Do We Know, What 
Should We Do? (Nov. 6, 2007), available at 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/uploads/2007_11-6_Forum_ 
(NXPowerLite).pdf. The term was introduced to counter the idea that global 
warming will be gradual and benign instead of more rapid and harmful as 
originally anticipated.  This is now the Obama Administration’s preferred term. 
See Carol Driver, White House Solves the Problem of Climate Change 
Overnight…By Officially Changing the Phrase to ‘Global Climate Disruption’, 
DAILY MAIL, Sept. 17, 2010, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ 
worldnews/article-1312874/White-House-changes-global-warming-global-
climate-disruption.html. 
  
Thus, water law and policy can fairly be described as a system 
that promotes sustainable water use. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss3/2
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Sustainable development can serve as a useful benchmark 
against which existing laws and policies can be measured.  To 
merit the label sustainable, water laws and policies must meet 
two old and two new standards: (1) can they secure long term 
supplies for both consumptive and non-consumptive uses; (2) can 
they do so equitably; (3) do they adequately promote aquatic 
ecosystem conservation and restoration; and, (4) do they promote 
effective GCD adaptation?  In short, sustainable development 
should only refer to game changing policies and legal reforms. 
II.  FROM THE DEVELOPING TO THE DEVELOPED 
WORLD 
To understand the challenges of applying sustainable 
development to concrete laws and policies, one must understand 
its political history and the legacy of this history.  Politics has left 
us with two versions of sustainable development, hard and soft.  
Hard sustainable development remains a very contested principle 
because in many cases it requires that the status quo be changed 
to rebalance extraction, production and consumption patterns.4  
On the other hand, soft sustainable development is all too often 
simply a relabeling device, “green washing,” to avoid the concrete 
reforms that hard sustainable development requires.5
A.  The Modern Origins of the Construct 
 
The modern origins of the construct stem from political 
efforts to engage the developing world in the project of 
environmental protection, but the construct draws from the 
earlier economists’ warnings against over-rapid, often wasteful, 
 
 4. See generally Johan Rockström et al., Planetary Boundaries: Exploring 
the Safe Operating Space for Humanity, 14 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 32 (2009). 
 5. Error! Main Document Only.Greenwashing refers to efforts by 
corporations to promote products as environmentally “friendly” to attract caring 
consumers. See Greenwashing/United States, SOURCE WATCH, 
http://www.sourcewatch.org/ 
index.php?title=Greenwashing/United_States#External_links (last visited Mar. 
26, 2011). 
3
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resource exploitation.6  At the 1972 international environmental 
conference in Stockholm, Sweden, the developing world rejected 
the idea of universal, aggressive environmental protection as a 
new form of colonialism.7  To bridge this north-south divide, the 
construct of sustainable development as a “soft” norm was 
created.  Although it was essentially a political compromise, the 
idea of sustainable development has its roots in classical resource 
economics.  Since at least the 1930s, economists have tried to 
determine the optimal time horizon for the exploitation of 
nonrenewable resources, as well as the best exploration rate of 
renewable resources to guarantee their perpetual (or at least long 
term) availability.8
Sustainable development worked because each side got 
enough to launch the construct, and it was left to future 
generations to sort out its inherent contractions.  The north was 
forced to recognize the post World War II international law right 
to develop, embraced by developing nations to assert ownership 
and control of their valuable natural resources.
 
9  This right is an 
incident of territorial sovereignty, and its post World War II 
recognition helped to convince the newly independent nations of 
Africa and Asia to embrace international law despite its history 
as serving as a justification for the conquest and subjugation of 
the uncivilized world.10
 
 6. ERROR! MAIN DOCUMENT ONLY.JACK HIRSCHLEIFER, JAMES C. DEHAVEN 
& JEROME W. MILLIMAN, WATER SUPPLY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLICY 
59- 66 (1960). 
  In return, the north forced the south to 
 7. LYNTON KEITH CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: FROM 
THE TWENTIETH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 64-65 (3d ed. 1996). 
 8. HIRSCHLEIFER, DEHAVEN & MILLIMAN, supra note 6, at 63-64. 
 9. The right is enshrined in the first part of Principle 21 of the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration, United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972, Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (June 16, 
1972), and Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 
(Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992). 
 10. For summaries of the vast literature on this subject see generally B S 
Chimni, The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third 
World Approach, 8 MELB. J. INT’L. L. 27 (2007); B. S.  Chimni, The Principle of 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Toward a Radical 
Interpretation, 38 INDIAN J.  INT’L. L. 208 (1998). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss3/2
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accept limitations on the right beyond those recognized by 
customary international law.11  The word “sustainable” was 
designed to constrain rapid exploitation by replacing it with less 
environmentally destructive12 and more socially equitable13 
development options, although the standard definitions do not 
expressly impose this limitation.  Thus, sustainable development 
is an important aspiration.  However, it was dismissed from the 
start as incoherent and incapable of application, because 
sustainable development contains three linked, potentially 
inconsistent,14 standards designed to be “game changers” for 
three marginalized classes: (1) the poor by providing a measure of 
social justice to victims of development;15 (2) future generations; 
and, (3) the nonhuman, “natural” world.16
Despite the incoherence argument, sustainable development 
has persevered as an international policy norm for political 
reasons.  The European donor community has embraced the 
concept and imposed it on donees.  Any project that hopes to 
qualify for funding must be styled in an effort to promote 
sustainable development.
 
17
 
 11. The basic duty is not to cause harm to the territory of other states. See 
The Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938 & 1941). 
  Developing nations are happy to play 
the relabeling game because any project can be styled 
sustainable.  Without universal standards, there is no effective 
 12. See generally James C. Coomer, The Nature of the Quest for a Sustainable 
Society, in QUEST FOR A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 1 (James C. Coomer ed., 1981). 
 13. See Edward B. Barbier, The Concept of Sustainable Economic 
Development, 14 ENVTL. CONSERVATION 101, 103 (1987). 
 14. Jaye Ellis & Stepan Wood, International Environmental Law, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY: A READER 343, 373 (Benjamin J. 
Richardson & Stepan Wood eds., 2006). 
 15. See Klaus Bosselmann, Ecological Justice and the Law, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY: A READER 129, 150-55 (Benjamin J. 
Richardson & Stepan Wood eds., 2006); see also ANDREW DOBSON, FAIRNESS AND 
FUTURITY: ESSAYS ON ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
(1999). 
 16. Error! Main Document Only.See Klaus Bosselmann, Ecological Justice 
and the Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY: A READER 129, 152 
(Benjamin J. Richardson & Stepan Wood eds., 2006). 
 17. See Benjamin J. Richardson, Sustainable Finance: Environmental Law 
and Institutions in Environmental Law for Sustainability, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY: A READER 309, 332-335 (Benjamin J. Richardson & 
Stepan Wood eds., 2006). 
5
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way to question “sustainability” of the subsequent project.  Both 
donors and donees are happy.  Donors have imposed a progressive 
international norm and donees have the money, even if only 
green or blue washing has occurred. 
To turn the principle from a “soft” to a “hard” legal one, 
scholars have attempted to reconcile and apply the three linked 
standards: economic, environmental stewardship over 
generations and social justice.  Economists have taken the lead.  
The economic dimension emphasizes two strands of neo-welfare 
economics.  The first and more familiar standard adopts the 
concern for more accurate measures of efficiency.18  The 
environmental movement brought the marginal economic concept 
of external costs to the forefront.  Too many products and 
activities are under priced because production does not reflect the 
full or social cost of the product or activity. Under pricing occurs 
either because regulations do not force the internalization of all 
externalities or because there is a partial subsidy.19  The second 
standard is the concept of foregone opportunity costs.  These are 
the foregone revenues (or other benefits) from alternative uses of 
the resource.20  Economists have consistently taught that it is 
rational to prefer present consumption to deferred consumption.21  
Future benefits have been discounted and the opportunity costs - 
the future value - of foregone resource development and use 
ignored.22
 
 18. See e.g., ROBERT COSTANZA ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO ECOLOGICAL 
ECONOMICS  (1997). 
  The efforts to calculate these costs force private and 
public actors to consider the long-term economic consequences of 
decisions as well as a broader mix of alternative activities.  The 
removal of old dams is an example of greater attention to 
opportunity costs.  The United States is starting to remove small- 
 19. Subsidies can be major barriers to sustainable development because they 
“have generated heavy economic and environmental costs and create 
unsustainable dependencies, especially in the agriculture, transportation, and 
energy sectors.” ROBERTO DE ANDRACA & KEN F. MCCREADY, INTERNALIZING 
ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS TO PROMOTE ECO-EFFICIENCY 42 (1994). 
 20. Error! Main Document Only.Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. DAVID W. PEARCE ET AL., SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMICS AND 
ENVIRONMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD 45 (1990). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss3/2
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and medium-sized dams, which yield smaller hydroelectricity 
benefits compared to economic values of a free-flowing river.23
B. Sustainable Development Policy and Law in the 
United States 
 
Sustainable development is embedded in the political 
vocabulary of the United States, but its impact on the law has 
thus far been marginal.  Under the influence of Vice President 
Gore, the Clinton Administration (1992-2000) embraced it;24 the 
Bush II Administration (2000-2008) did not repudiate the idea,25
Federal water planning illustrates the trivialization of 
sustainable development.  Since the late 1960s, when the era of 
dam building ended, the federal government has lacked a 
coherent water resources policy.
 
but did little to advance it.  Only a few remnants linger in areas 
such as water resources as a tag line. 
26
 
 23. See Brian Graber, Potential Economic Beneﬁts of Small Dam Removal, in 
DAM REMOVAL RESEARCH: STATUS AND PROSPECTS 56, 61-64 (William L. Graf ed., 
2003); David D. Hart et al., Dam Removal: Challenges and Opportunities for 
Ecological Research and River Restoration, 52 BIOSCIENCE, 669, 670 (2002). 
  In the interim, federal 
agencies are left to try and fill the gap on an ad hoc basis.  The 
main federal guidance document for the four major federal water 
resource agencies is the 1983 Federal Economic and 
Environmental Principles and Guidelines for Water and Related 
Land Use Implementation Studies (hereinafter “P & G”).  The P & 
G were out of date when they were issued during the first Reagan 
Administration because they inadequately reflected the end of the 
 24. See generally Error! Main Document Only.William K. Stevens, Gore 
Promises U.S. Leadership on Sustainable Development Path, N.Y.TIMES, June 
15, 1993. 
 25. See Exec. Order No. 13,423, 72 Fed. Reg. 3919 (Jan. 26, 2007). 
 26. To mix a metaphor, rivers of paper have flowed, documenting the need for 
a more coherent and sustainable federal water policy. See e.g., NAT’L WATER 
COMM’N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND 
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (1973); W. WATER POLICY REVIEW 
ADVISORY COMM’N, WATER IN THE WEST: CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 
(1998).  However, with the exception of calls for new federal infrastructure 
funding, the recommendations have been ignored.  For a concise history of 
federal water policies and why they gather dust, see generally Janet C. Neuman, 
Are We There Yet? Weary Travelers Along the Road to Water Policy Reform, 50 
NAT. RESOURCES. J. 139 (2010). 
7
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Big Dam Era.  In 2007, Congress finally directed the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers to revise them, and in 2008, in an attempt to 
revive this moribund institution, the Obama White House 
reassigned the task to the Council on Environmental Quality.27  
In 2009, the CEQ issued the first part of the revision.28  Principle 
1A states that the national water-planning objective is to “protect 
and restore natural ecosystems and the environment while 
encouraging sustainable economic development,” but the 
document does not further refine the construct.29
The development of a law of sustainability is another matter.  
Lawyers have tried to apply the norm, but they have been 
stymied by its incoherence.
  Sustainable 
development has fared better at the state and local level, at least 
in terms of being a policy goal. 
30  An influential concurring opinion 
in an International Court of Justice case embraced the construct 
as an international norm,31
 
 27. See generally COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, PROPOSED NATIONAL 
OBJECTIVES, PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS FOR WATER AND LAND RELATED 
RESOURCES IMPLEMENTATION STUDIES 4 (2009). 
 but United States’ courts have not 
recognized it as an international or domestic norm.  For example, 
the Court in the Rio Tinto litigation refused to hold that the 
discharge of mining wastes in Papua New Guinea violated the 
international duty to practice sustainable development, because 
it lacks the definition, obligatory nature and universal 
 28. See id. 
 29. The revision simply adopts the vacuous definition found in Exec. Order 
No. 13,423, 72 Fed. Reg. 3,919 (Jan. 26, 2007) (defining the term “sustainable” 
as “conditions, under which humans and nature can exist in productive 
harmony, that permit fulfilling social, economic, and other requirements of 
present and future generations . . . .”).  A National Research Council Committee, 
on which I served, criticized the revision for its lack of “clarity and consistency.” 
COMM. ON IMPROVING PRINCIPLES & GUIDELINES FOR FED. WATER RES. PROJECT 
PLANNING, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, A REVIEW OF THE  
PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES WATER 
RESOURCES PLANNING DOCUMENT 2, 4 (2010). 
 30. For early, somewhat optimistic, attempts to apply the norm, see J.B. 
Ruhl, Sustainable Development: A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for 
Environmental Law, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 31 (1999); David R. Hodas, The Role 
of Law in Defining Sustainable Development: NEPA Reconsidered, 3 WIDENER L. 
SYMP. J. 1 (1998). 
 31. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 112 
(Sept. 25) (separate opinion of Judge Weermantry). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss3/2
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condemnation required under the Alien Tort Claims Act.32  At 
best, sustainability is invoked as an additional, non-necessary 
justification for government action.  For example, courts have 
occasionally upheld land use sustainability initiatives, which are 
easily justified on more traditional grounds.33
III.  SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND WATER 
LAW 
 
A. Water Law: Stability versus Adaptive Flexibility 
Water law is both the engine of unsustainable use practices 
and a basis for reform.  Water law allocates water among 
competing uses by performing three functions.  First, it sets the 
ground rules for the acquisition of the right to use water.  Second, 
because water performs a variety of essential societal functions, 
the law controls its allocation among competing private and 
public uses.  Third, the law distributes the pain of shortages 
among rights holders.  The law’s primary objective has been to 
create secure, semi-exclusive rights.  This is a desirable goal, but 
the resulting rights can “lock” water use into unsustainable use 
patterns. 
The extent of the “lock in” has become more important in 
recent decades for two reasons: (1) the demand for more water for 
aquatic ecosystem conservation and restoration has increased, 
and (2) GCD, which will potentially impact water use and 
management in all areas of the United States.  There is a 
relatively firm consensus that arid regions will face a net loss of 
stream flows.34
 
 32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); see also Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 
2d 1116, 1160-61 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated in part, 
456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006). Accord Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 
233, 237 (2d Cir. 2003). 
  Predictions are cloudier and mixed for more 
 33. See, e.g., Greenwood v. Mayor of Twp. of Hopewell, 2008 WL 3462431 at 
*14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 14, 2008) (upholding minimum lot 
requirement characterized as promoting sustainable development for a 
mountain area because the ordinance protected aquifer recharge areas and 
assured that each residence would obtain sufficient water). 
 34. See e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, COLORADO 
BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT: EVALUATING AND ADJUSTING TO HYDROCLIMATIC 
UNCERTAINTY 73-92 (2007).  This report summarizes the studies of the potential 
9
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humid areas, many of which may face increased, severe flood 
events, while others may experience lower stream flows and more 
frequent droughts.  For example, many scenarios predict that the 
naturally fluctuating lake-level cycles in the Great Lakes may 
produce lower lows and less-high highs.35  The legal implication 
is that water rights need to have some flexibility in order to 
respond to changed supplies and new demands.36
Water law has some capacity to respond to these “lock in” 
problems because water rights have always been incomplete 
rather than complete property rights.
 
37  Water is simultaneously 
a semi-exclusive, shared, and partially communal resource.38  
Water law has always provided users clear notice of the risks of a 
reduction in the amount of water to which they will be entitled.  
The risks include reduced quantities because of a drought, the 
wasteful or non-beneficial use of water, and total or partial 
displacement by “higher” or subsequent uses including public 
rights.39
 
impact of warmer temperatures in the Colorado River Basin.  It concludes that 
more scenarios predict modest stream flow decreases but “[a]ny future decreases 
in the Colorado River stream flow . . . would be especially troubling because the 
quantity of water allocations under the Law of the River already exceeds the 
amount of the annual mean Colorado River Flows.” Id. at 92. See also Stephen 
Saunders et al., HOTTER AND DRIER: THE WEST’S CHANGED CLIMATE 10 (2008). 
  This article will explore specific legal responses to these 
 35. See generally Error! Main Document Only.Noah D. Hall & Bret B. 
Stuntz, Climate Change and the Great Lakes Water Resources: Avoiding Future 
Conflicts with Conservation, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 641 (2008). 
 36. See Carolyn Brickey et al., How to Take Climate Change Into Account: A 
Guidance Document for Judges Adjudicating Water Disputes, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 
11215, 11226-27 (2010). 
 37. See In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 493 (Haw. 2000). 
 38. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Global Climate Change and Water Law 
Reform, 15 WIDENER L. REV. 409, 418 (2010). 
 39. In rare cases, the public trust may require the displacement of existing 
water rights that impair trust values. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court 
of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); 
In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 461.  In Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010), the 
Supreme Court held, in a unanimous 8-0 decision, that a Florida statute which 
replaced the common law rule that littoral owners are entitled to coastal 
accretions with a statute that fixed erosion control lines and awarded any gain 
(or loss) seaward of the line to the state was not a taking. Id. at 2612. However, 
the four-justice plurality opinion also suggested, but did not hold, that a judicial 
decision, such as the Florida Supreme Court opinion upholding the statute, 
could be a judicial taking. Id. at 2615.  Four justices disagreed with the principle 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss3/2
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questions and evaluate their adequacy.  It will also examine how 
the law both seeks to provide users secure rights and adjusts 
them based on changed conditions. 
 
B. Three Uses of Sustainability to Evaluate Water Law 
Sustainable development can potentially serve three 
important functions to move water law and policy to more 
sustainable use patterns.  First, it can be used to spotlight 
existing laws and policies which promote unsustainable uses and, 
therefore, should be reformed.  Second, it can be used as a 
positive label to provide additional support for efforts to promote 
more efficient, less wasteful, and socially inclusive water uses.  
Third, it can be a concrete standard to constrain unsustainable 
uses, thereby freeing up more water for sustainable uses, which 
include more efficient consumption, environmental protection, 
and the promotion of social justice.  However, these uses carry 
two major risks.  First, relabeling a law or policy as sustainable 
or unsustainable can be a formal change with no substantive 
consequences, also referred to as “blue washing.”  Second, given 
the vagueness of the construct, labeling a law or policy as 
unsustainable will be contested by users who seek to preserve the 
status quo. 
1. Spotlighting Unsustainability 
Spotlighting is a mixed negative-positive use of sustainable 
development.  The hope is that the identification of obvious 
candidates for the unsustainable label will produce change.  For 
good reason, much sustainable development scholarship focuses 
on deeply-rooted and persistent unsustainable policies, laws and 
practices because they are widespread.  As the leading legal 
scholar of the construct has observed, “[s]ince 2002 . . . [the 
United States] . . . most often [has] moved in the wrong direction - 
toward greater consumption of energy, materials, land, and other 
 
or reasoned that the case was not an appropriate one to formulate a judicial 
takings doctrine.  Justice Stevens, a Florida beachfront condominium owner, did 
not participate in the decision. Id. at 2597. 
11
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resources, and more negative environmental consequences, with 
damaging social, economic, and security consequences.”40
One of the key indicators of unsustainable development is the 
presence of a subsidy.  Subsidized development is often styled as 
the opposite of sustainable development because it does not have 
to bear the full costs of production and thus is not efficient and is 
often socially inequitable.  Although not all subsidies are bad,
  This 
section briefly examines two well-known examples of 
unsustainable water use: irrigation subsidies and the over-
exploitation of semi-renewable groundwater. 
41
The Reclamation Act of 1902
 
those, which are not designed to promote social justice or to 
induce sustainable development, are vulnerable to being labeled 
unsustainable and unjustified.  Bureau of Reclamation subsidies 
to farmers are a prime example of a subsidy that merits such a 
label. 
42
 
 40. Contributing Authors, Progress Toward Sustainability: A Report Card, in 
AGENDA FOR A SUSTAINABLE AMERICA 15 (John C. Dernbach ed., 2009).  This is a 
follow-up to an earlier comprehensive and critical look at United States’ efforts 
to promote sustainable development, many of which began in the Clinton 
Administration during the period 1992-2000. See generally STUMBLING TOWARD 
SUSTAINABILITY (John C. Dernbach ed. 2002). 
 envisioned a Western United 
States with many small irrigation communities.  To achieve this 
utopian vision, the original idea was that the federal government 
would loan newly formed districts the necessary money to 
 41. The development of the technology to render omega-3 and fish oil from 
Asian carp, which threaten to disrupt the Great Lakes ecosystem, is an example 
of a sustainable subsidy.  The technology exists to render Asian carp for this 
purpose with no resulting odor or waste water, and thus provide incentives for 
fishermen to catch them before they migrate into the Lakes.  However, the gap 
between what a plant can pay and what fishermen will accept in exchange for 
catching them is ten cents per pound.  This is not a “pay-to-pollute” subsidy 
granted to an industry that is trying to avoid bearing the full cost of its 
externalities.  Instead, there is a need for a startup subsidy to create a business 
whose primary purpose is to harvest an invasive species that needs to be 
controlled or eradicated. See, e.g., Andrea J. Fowler et al., Failure of the Lacey 
Act to Protect U.S. Ecosystems Against Animal Invasions, 5 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY 
& ENV’T 353 (2007).  I am indebted to Kate Thomas, J.D. Candidate, Class of 
June 2011 at Chicago-Kent College of Law, for her water law paper that brought 
this method of dealing with exotic species to my attention. See Kate Thomas, 
One Man’s Trash . . . Is Another Man’s Treasure (2010) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 42. Reclamation Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-161, 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (codified 
at of 43 U.S.C. § 371 (2006)). 
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construct a project, and that over time the districts would repay 
the federal loan.43  Some small districts have repaid these loans, 
but in other areas the Reclamation Program has become an 
example of unsustainable agriculture that rivals the documented 
waste and over-production of water intensive crops in countries 
such as Egypt and India.44
California’s massive Central Valley Project [hereinafter 
“CVP”] illustrates how federal water policies encourage 
unsustainable agricultural practices to both the detriment of the 
environment and farmers themselves.  The CVP was authorized 
in 1936 and constructed over the next three decades
 
45 at an 
initial cost of $3.6 billion.46  A massive subsidy was incorporated 
into the project from the start; $2 billion of the total cost was 
classified as non-reimbursable.47  For example, individual 
farmers were not expected to pay for the flood control component 
of the CVP.  Even with this generous federal subsidy, only 11 
percent of the remaining repayment obligation had been repaid 
by 2002.48  The Bureau of Reclamation’s 40-year supply contracts 
set water rates too low to pay back the reimbursable construction 
costs.49
The poster children of subsidy beneficiaries are the large 
farms in the Westlands Water District in the Upper San Joaquin 
Valley.  Farmers there pay about $17.00 per acre-foot instead of 
the $39.00 necessary to recoup the costs.
 
50
 
 43. See e.g., HOLLY DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE KLAMATH 
BASIN: MACHO LAW, COMBAT BIOLOGY, AND DIRTY POLITICS 50 (2008). 
  The opportunity costs 
of the subsidy become apparent when clean alternative values of 
the water are calculated.  For example, in 1992, Congress 
 44. See SANDRA POSTEL, LAST OASIS: FACING WATER SCARCITY 166-67 (2d ed. 
1997). 
 45. See NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND WATER: 
A HISTORY 235-76 (1st ed., revised 2001) (setting out the political history of the 
project). 
 46. Executive Summary, Taxpayers Guarantee Central Valley Farms Water 
Through a Subsidy Worth Up to $416 Million Per Year, ENVT’L WORKING GRP., 
CAL. WATER SUBSIDIES, http://archive.ewg.org/reports/Watersubsidies/ 
printerfriendly.php (last visited Feb. 14, 2011). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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responded to the environmental impacts of CVP agricultural 
diversions by creating an 800,000 acre-foot Environmental Water 
Account.51  Federal officials can purchase water for instream 
flows to offset the damage to fish stocks caused by project 
diversion.  In 2002, the Bureau paid $122.00 per acre-foot.52
Westland’s unsustainable use of water is widely known,
 
53 but 
the question is what does labeling the use as unsustainable 
accomplish?  The answer is mixed.  The district is facing 
pressures to rethink its water use.  As the last unit of the CVP, 
they are the first to be cut back in drought years, which were 
frequent in the first decade of this century.  The District soils are 
rich, but intensive irrigation has rendered over 100,000 acres too 
saline to grow crops and up to 200,000 more need to be retired 
because they are contaminated with selenium or have drainage 
problems.  The combination of environmental demands for 
upstream water, self-induced contamination, the vagaries of 
California’s climate and the ability of urban water suppliers to 
pay top dollar for water have forced the district to make some 
sustainability moves, such as drip irrigation, crop substitution 
and land fallowing.54
Arizona’s efforts to use its groundwater sustainably are a 
more complex example of the strengths and limits of spotlighting.  
As central Arizona began to grow after World War II, the state 
steadily mined its aquifers, betting that eventually the federal 
  However, spotlighting has not changed the 
game.  It has not caused the District to confront the limits of its 
current practices and change its consumption water patterns.  
The District has taken these steps to maintain the status quo to 
the maximum extent possible for the foreseeable future. Despite 
the efficiency moves, water use has remained constant. 
 
 51. Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub. L. 
No. 102-575, § 3406(b)(2), 106 Stat. 4600, 4604 (1992). 
 52. Executive Summary, Taxpayers Guarantee Central Valley Farms Water 
Through a Subsidy Worth Up to $416 Million Per Year, ENVT’L WORKING GRP., 
CAL. WATER SUBSIDIES, http://archive.ewg.org/reports/Watersubsidies/ 
printerfriendly.php (last visited Feb. 14, 2011). 
 53. See e.g., Matt Jenkins, The Cadillac of California Irrigation Districts’ Has 
More Than a Tiny Fish to Blame for Its Troubles, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Jan. 11, 
2010, at 2, 5, available at http://www.revivethesanjoaquin.org/content/cadillac-
california-irrigation-districts-has-more-tiny-fish-blame-its-troubles. 
 54. See id. at 5-8. 
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government would build a pipeline from the Colorado River to 
Phoenix and Tucson.  Congress did build the pipeline under the 
Central Arizona Project, but the Carter Administration exacted a 
high price.  Arizona was forced to enact the 1980 Groundwater 
Management Act (GMA).55  The goal of the GMA is to limit 
groundwater use in the four Active Management Areas to safe 
yield.56  The law also imposed a duty on developers and their 
municipal suppliers to establish that “sufficient supplies of water 
are physically available to meet all or part of the estimated water 
demand of the development for 100 years.”57  Initially, the 100-
year guaranteed supply rule set off a scramble to acquire 
agricultural water rights in remote counties, but more recently 
municipal suppliers began paying the high CAP rates for 
Arizona’s under-used Colorado River entitlement.58  This price 
shock was alleviated by the creation of the Central Arizona 
Groundwater Replenishment District, which allows members to 
bank and withdraw groundwater.59  As Phoenix and Tucson have 
used more surface water from CAP, municipal water use has 
started to decline in part because of a wetter than average cycle, 
groundwater conservation, and the increasing reliance on 
recycled (“gray”) water for turf irrigation.  Still, safe yield, i.e., 
sustainable use, remains an unfulfilled aspiration,60 and other 
parts of the state are mining their supplies.61  Furthermore, 
central Arizona is facing serious subsidence problems.62
 
 55. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 45-401-45-704 (2010). 
 
 56. Error! Main Document Only.See generally Robert Jerome Glennon, 
“Because That’s Where the Water Is”: Retiring Current Water Uses to Achieve the 
Safe-Yield Objective of the Arizona Groundwater Management Act, 33 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 89 (1991). 
 57. ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R12-15-703(b) (1995). 
 58. See generally ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUND-WATER PUMPING 
AND THE FATE OF AMERICA’S FRESH WATERS (2002). 
 59. See Katharine L. Jacobs & James M. Holway, Managing for 
Sustainability in an Arid Climate: Lessons Learned from 20 Years of 
Groundwater Management in Arizona, USA, 12 HYDROGEOLOGY J. 52, 58-60 
(2004). 
 60. See Paul Hirt, Annie Gustafson & Kelli L. Larson, The Mirage in the 
Valley of the Sun, 13 ENVTL. HIST. 482, 486 (2008). 
 61. A study of North Arizona’s needs found that continued reliance on 
groundwater use was unsustainable and recommended that water be 
transferred by pipeline from Lake Powell.  See U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU 
OF RECLAMATION, NORTH CENTRAL ARIZONA WATER SUPPLY STUDY, REPORT OF 
15
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Wallace Stegner has argued that water stress is a sign that 
we have used the benefits of western civilization and technology 
to create a society largely disconnected from the landscape and 
climate.63  Ideally, spotlighting should promote a new dialogue 
about the sustainable settlement patterns appropriate for a 
climate.  Fragments of the dialogue occur, but the result is 
primarily hand-wringing as cities scramble to support unlimited 
growth.  But the reality remains- there are few, if any, natural 
barriers to the endless growth of the West.  However, the limits 
question is an important one that will eventually have to be 
addressed.  As much of the West continues to grow or be exploited 
for raw commodities, the opportunity costs of the choices we make 
increase.64
2. A Gold Star for Legal and Policy Innovation   
 
a. Legal Innovation 
Sustainable development is a potentially destabilizing idea 
because it requires the modification of the status quo, including 
property rights that support unsustainable resource use patterns.  
The need to introduce some limitations on resource use is bitterly 
contested, and the need for stable property rights is often raised 
as argument against any change.65
 
FINDINGS iv (2006), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/phoenix/reports/ncawss/ 
NCAWSSP1NOAPP.pdf. 
  Certainly sustainable 
development requires investment protected by a high degree of 
 62. See generally ROBERT GLENNON, UNQUENCHABLE: AMERICA’S WATER CRISIS 
AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2009). 
 63. See generally WALLACE STEGNER, THE AMERICAN WEST AS LIVING SPACE  
(1989). 
 64. See A. Dan Tarlock, A Brief Examination of the History of the Persistent 
Debate About Limits to Western Growth, 10 HASTINGS W.- NW. J. OF ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 155, 159-166 (2008) (tracing the history of dissenters to the conclusion 
that as the West grows, the opportunity costs of choices we make increase). 
 65. See e.g., Soctt Andrew Shepard, The Unbearable Cost of Skipping the 
Check: Property Rights, Takings Compensation & Ecological Protection in the 
Western Water Law Context, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 1063 (2009). 
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stability.  However, at the margin, property law has always been 
open to change.66
Anglo-American property law is grounded in the thinking of 
Hume and Bentham, although there is a great deal of natural law 
noise.  Hume argued that we recognize property because 
otherwise no one would work and society would be worse off.
 
67  
Bentham took Hume’s utilitarian theory of property as a mental 
state and reduced it in his famous phrase “Property is nothing 
but the basis of expectation.”68  Expectation is a function of law 
and thus can change over time.  Thus, property is positive and 
political – not pre-political as Locke posited.69  Thus, expectations 
must adjust to extraordinary and long-lasting changed conditions 
such as GCD and social costs of unsustainable resource use 
impact.  Courts have increasingly refused to recognize abstract 
property rights when there was no reasonable expectation of the 
interest and limited demoralization costs to non-recognition.70  It 
is a logical step to adjust expectations in light of increased state 
regulation and great owner responsibility for mitigating the 
expected impacts of GCD.71
 
 66. See William A. Fischel, The Evolution of Homeownership, 77 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1503, 1505 (2010) (“Property institutions . . . are not static, and new 
economic and technological conditions warrant some modification in the 
infrastructure of property . . . law.”). 
 
 67. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on 
the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 
1208- 1211  (1967) (tracing the development of utilitarian property theory). 
 68. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 137 (1840); see also Frank 
I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1208- 1213  
(1967) (tracing the development of utilitarian property theory). 
 69. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17- 18 (Bobbs-Merrill ed. 
1952).  The leading modern theorist of property as a fundamental, pre-political 
right grounded in human nature is the late Robert Nozick. See generally ROBERT 
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). 
 70. See e.g., Chance v. BP Chemicals, Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 991 (Ohio 1996) 
(refusal to apply trespass to chemical plume that migrated beneath plaintiff’s 
land but caused no damage because subsurface rights are limited). 
 71. Professor Holly D. Doremus has identified some of the relevant factors 
that justify changes in regulations that serve as a starting point to analyze the 
role that GCC may play in changing the law of regulatory takings.  They are (1) 
justification for the change; (2) the foreseeability and ability of property owners 
to adapt to change; (3) the abruptness of the change; and (4) the general nature 
of the new regulation. See Holly D. Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. 
17
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A 2007 Colorado Supreme Court decision72 is an example of a 
decision that can be labeled as promoting sustainable 
development though the adjustment of unreasonable 
expectations, although there is a counter-conclusion.  A Colorado 
water court had previously awarded two small districts serving 
Pagosa Springs (a small, not rapidly growing city in southwestern 
Colorado) a conditional water right for 29,000 acre-feet, return 
flows, and the right to continuously refill a reservoir based on a 
100-year planning horizon.73  No study had demonstrated need 
for the water in the foreseeable future; a local water district saw 
that unappropriated water was available and made an impulsive 
purchase.  The district thought it did not have to go through the 
trouble of making the best practicable future demand projection.  
They were not wrong to make this assumption.  Municipal water 
suppliers have long enjoyed a super preference to acquire the 
water rights necessary to support unlimited growth.  In the West, 
municipalities have been exempt from the prohibition against 
holding water rights for future use and thus for a “speculative” 
purpose.74
The Colorado Supreme Court remanded the Water Court’s 
decision because the Water Court failed to make sufficient 
findings concerning the area’s future growth projections and 
refused to give cities a blanket exemption from the need to 
  This has shielded cities from making realistic 
planning projections that incorporate climate change, for 
example, and asking questions about the amount of growth 
desired. 
 
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 31 (2003).  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 
(2001) refused to hold that long standing state regulation of wetlands was a  
defense to takings challenge to a denial of permit to fill.  However, Justice 
O’Connor’s concurring opinion argued that the length of the regulation of a 
factor to be considered in calculating the land owner’s investment backed 
expectations. See id. at 632. On remand, The trial court found that proposed fill 
would be a public nuisance. See J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, 58 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 753, 776 (2008). 
 72. Pagosa Springs Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited, 170 
P.3d 307 (Colo. 2007). 
 73. See id. at 309. 
 74. See A. Dan Tarlock, We Are All Water Lawyers Now: Water Law’s 
Potential but Limited Impact on Urban Growth Management, in WET GROWTH: 
SHOULD WATER LAW CONTROL LAND USE? 57, 80 (Craig Anthony Arnold ed., 
2005). 
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demonstrate that they would put the water to actual beneficial 
use within a reasonable period of time.75  Citing a National 
Research Council study, the Court reasoned that municipalities’ 
statutory exemption from the need to have a vested legal interest 
in the lands served does not immunize governmental water 
supply agencies from the state’s anti-speculative doctrines.76  
Cities must have considerable latitude to plan for future growth, 
but a supplier must still demonstrate three elements to make a 
non-speculative appropriation: (1) what is a reasonable water 
supply planning period; (2) what are the substantial population 
projections based on a normal growth rate for that period; and (3) 
what amount of available unappropriated water is reasonably 
necessary to serve reasonably anticipated needs of the 
governmental agency for the planning period, above its current 
supply?77
On remand, the Water Court declined to take new evidence 
and instead entered a new proposed degree awarding the District 
25,300 acre feet of storage rights and reduced the planning 
horizon to 2055.
 
78  The Colorado Supreme Court agreed that the 
Water Court properly reduced the planning horizon to 2055,79 but 
held that the District had not carried its burden of showing that 
they had a non-speculative intent to put the water to beneficial 
use given the wide variation in area population projections 
between the District’s projections and a state study.80  The city 
argued that the municipal conditional water appropriations were 
legislative or quasi-legislative acts immune from judicial 
review,81
 
 75. Pagosa Springs Area Water & Sanitation Dist.,170 P.3d at 309-310. 
 but the court rejected the argument as inconsistent 
with Colorado water law.  The holding of this case may be limited 
to smaller cities with unrealistic growth projections, but it has 
been attacked as a major barrier to municipal water supply 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 313. 
 78. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited, 219 P.3d 774, 
776 (Colo. 2009). 
 79. Id. at 777. 
 80. Id. at 785. 
 81. Id. at 788. 
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planning.82
Hawaii’s creative use of the public trust doctrine to rebalance 
municipal and environmental water use has also resulted in other 
decisions that merit the sustainability label.  In 2000, the 
Supreme Court held that the public trust required the state to 
establish minimum stream flow standards before it reallocated 
water from an abandoned sugar plantation.
  Still, the case can be labeled as a gold star effort to 
promote sustainable development because it asks cities to claim 
water only for realistic future demand and opens up the 
possibility that other claimants, in this case environmental 
interests, may be able to dedicate some of the area’s water supply 
to alternative, sustainable uses. 
83  One of the key 
legal principles of sustainable development is the precautionary 
principle, and the Court merged it with the public trust by 
mandating its use to establish instream flow standards in 
advance of the necessary research and monitoring.84  In 
subsequent cases, the Court subordinated new urban water 
rights’ applications, and Native Hawaiian needs, in addition to 
instream flow needs.85
b. Policy Innovation 
 
The sustainability label can also be used to more clearly 
articulate important emerging policy changes.  The growing 
 
 82. For an alarmist reading of the case which suggests that Denver may 
become a Mesa Verde – an abandoned civilization, see Casey S. Funk & Daniel 
J. Arnold, Pagosa - - The Great and Growing Cities Doctrine Imperiled: An 
Objective Look From a Biased Perspective, 13 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 283, 318-
19 (2010) (discussing how Pagosa I and II may create future Mesa Verdes). 
 83. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 460 (Haw. 2000). 
 84. Id. at  467. 
 85. See e.g. In re Waiola O Molokai, Inc., 83 P.3d 664 (Haw. 2004); In Re 
Water Use Permit Application (Kukui Molokai), Inc., 174 P.3d 329 (Haw. 2007); 
see also David L. Callies & Calvert G. Chipchase, Water Regulation, Land use, 
and the Environment, 30 U. HAW. L. REV. 49, 94 (2007) (criticizing the decisions 
for giving a strong but not absolute preference to non-economic uses of water 
and reducing, “nearly to the point of extinction” private water rights). But see 
Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role for State 
Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 838-41 (2010) 
(discussing how the public trust supports adaptation to climate change and how 
Hawaiian Supreme Court decisions provide examples of its evolutionary and 
adaptive potential). 
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recognition of the idea of the normative river is an example of this 
use.  For the first sixty years of the twentieth century, United 
States water policy was based on the assumption that rivers 
should be rationally developed through large and small projects 
so that not a drop of water would be wasted.86  Today, for 
budgetary and environmental reasons, the United States must 
learn to learn to live with that legacy of water infrastructure, as 
we have come to appreciate the ecosystem functions and services 
that natural systems such as rivers provide.87  Modern water 
planning must now accommodate a wide range of river functions, 
from power generation to ecosystem protection.  Put differently, 
we now want rivers that work, not just working rivers.88
The normative river tries to mimic, to the extent feasible, 
flow patterns that existed prior to the time that a river was 
dammed and the channel modified.  Although the concept is still 
only a scientific construct, we are implementing it in all but 
name.  All over the country, on rivers large and small, we have 
imposed minimum flows.  The process is ad hoc, the coverage 
spotty, the amounts vary, and often flow targets or ecosystem 
restoration objectives have not been met.  Often these flows are 
the result of relicensed hydroelectric facilities or the settlement of 
disputes over protection of endangered species or Indian water 
rights.
 
89  For example, we often mandate minimum flows when 
threatened or endangered species are at risk.90
 
 86. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, U.S. ARMY CORPS 
OF ENGINEERS WATER RESOURCES PLANNING: A NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR SERVICE 38 
(2004) (Rational water resources planning “would eliminate the `waste’ of water 
and control the vagaries of nature.”). 
  We are also doing 
this to restore entire ecosystems which have been altered by 
 87. See id. at 41- 45. 
 88. See, e.g., W. WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMM’N, WATER IN THE 
WEST: CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 2-13 (1998) (discussing the distinction 
between a working river, which is dammed and managed for flood control, 
irrigation, hydroelectric generation and municipal water supply, and a river 
that works by providing a wide range of ecosystem services). 
 89. See e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Rodgers, No. CIV S-88-1658 
LKK/GGH, 2006 WL 4589446 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2006) (settlement providing for 
both instream flows and flows to support irrigation diversions). 
 90. See A. DAN TARLOCK, JAMES N. CORBRIDGE, JR., DAVID H. GETCHES, & REED 
D. BENSON, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 737-47 (6th ed. 2009); see also 
Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985). 
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human intervention.  For example, in 2000, Congress enacted the 
Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan as part of the 
omnibus Water Resources Development Act.91  The Everglade’s 
ecosystem depends on seasonal sheet flows of water from the 
Kissimmee River in central Florida and Lake Okeechobee.92  To 
make South Beach, South Beach, these flows were substantially 
diverted for agricultural and urban development and flood 
control.  The objective of the 2000 legislation is no less than to 
replumb the Everglades to restore some measure of pre-diversion 
flows.93  The 1992 Central Valley Project Improvement Act94 is 
another, earlier example of restoration ecosystem flows; the Act 
mandates an 800,000 acre environmental account to prevent 
further environmental degradation in the California-Bay Delta.95
The important point is that minimum flow requirements are 
increasingly seen as a necessary and legitimate constraint on 
hydroelectric production and the exercise state water rights in 
order to redress the costs of the historic pattern of using water 
without consideration of the environmental impacts.  However, 
we lack a consistent and comprehensive approach to redressing 
the past abuses of our rivers.  Affixing the sustainable 
development label to these ad hoc experiments will not in and of 
itself create this approach.  However, it can clarify a policy 
evolution and add legitimacy to the normative river, which is still 
 
 
 91. See Water Resources Development Act, Pub. L. 106-541, §601, 114 Stat 
2572 (2000); see also DAVID MCCALLY, THE EVERGLADES: AN ENVIRONMENTAL 
HISTORY (2000); EVERGLADES: THE ECOSYSTEM AND ITS RESTORATION (Steven M. 
Davis & John C. Ogden eds., 1994); C. Walters, Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. 
Holling, Experimental Policies for Water Management in the Everglades, 2 
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 189 (1992). 
 92. See C. Walters, Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling, Experimental 
Policies for Water Management in the Everglades, 2 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 
189, 192 (1992). 
 93. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS & S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST., CENTRAL 
AND SOUTHERN FLORIDA COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW STUDY, FINAL INTEGRATED 
FEASIBILITY REPORT AND PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 7 
(1999); see also Michael Voss, The Central and South Florida Comprehensive 
Review Study: Restoring the Everglades, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 751, 757 (2000). 
 94. Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub. L. 
No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4600 (1992). 
 95. See Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, 106 
Stat. at 4714; see also Dave Owen, Law, Environmental Dynamism, Reliability: 
The Rise and Fall of CALFED, 37 ENVTL. L. 1145 (2007). 
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perceived as radical and destabilizing, by linking it to more 
accepted norms.  It also contributes a new construct which is 
consistent with GCD adaptation strategies. 
3. Social Justice Promotion: The Case of Indian 
Tribal Water Rights 
Explicitly labeling a doctrine as a positive example of 
sustainable development can sometimes clarify and solidify its 
social justice base.  The Supreme Court’s creation of a special 
class of water rights for Indian reservations is an example of this 
use of sustainable development, although students of water and 
Indian water law would be surprised at this characterization.96  
The Supreme Court’s decision to mitigate the impacts of 
“progress” and “civilization” on the surviving tribes is an amazing 
story.  In the 19th century, Indian tribes were herded onto 
remnant reservations to move them out of “harm’s way.”97  
Reservations were seen as a way to assimilate98 into the superior 
white, agricultural and Christian society by the most adaptive 
Indians.99  Water law proceeded on the assumptions that prior 
appropriation was the only system of water allocation suitable for 
the inter-mountain West because it was a natural adaptation to a 
new environment and that all water rights issued from the states 
not the federal government.100
 
 96. See generally Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1903); see also A. 
Dan Tarlock, Tribal Justice and Property Rights: The Evolution of Winters v. 
United States, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 471, 477 (2010). 
 
 97. See generally BRIAN W. DIPPIE, THE VANISHING AMERICAN: WHITE 
ATTITUDES AND U.S. INDIAN POLICY (1982). 
 98. The literature on Indians and Indian policy is vast.  Among the best 
treatments are BRIAN W. DIPPIE, THE VANISHING AMERICAN: WHITE ATTITUDES 
AND U.S. INDIAN POLICY (1982); FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS (1984); AUGIE FLERAS & 
JEAN LOENARD ELIOT, THE “NATIONS WITHIN”: ABORIGINAL-STATE RELATIONS IN 
CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND NEW ZEALAND 2 (1992). 
 99. See R. DOUGLAS HURT, INDIAN AGRICULTURE IN AMERICA: PREHISTORY TO 
THE PRESENT 96-100 (1988) (tracing the idea of civilizing the Indians through 
agriculture from the late 18th century to its first legislative manifestation in 
1819); see also DAVID RICH LEWIS, NEITHER WOLF NOR DOG: AMERICAN INDIANS, 
ENVIRONMENT, AND AGRARIAN CHANGE (1994). 
 100. In 1935, the Supreme Court held that three Congressional acts between 
1866 and 1877 severed water from the public domain and acquiesced in 
23
02 TarlockMacro 4/22/2011  9:15 PM 
2011] WATER LAW AND POLICY 665 
 
The right arose when the federal government claimed a state 
appropriated right for an Indian reservation in Montana, but it 
turned out that the white irrigators’ rights were superior by four 
days.  Nonetheless, the Tribe prevailed.  Winters v. United 
States101 created an unprecedented hybrid appropriative-riparian 
right for tribes.102  The Court unanimously held that Indian 
reservations have an implied water right, a priority as of the date 
of an 1888 Treaty modifying the reservation.103  However, 
reserved rights or “Winters rights”, as they came to be called, do 
not depend on application to beneficial use.  As is the case with 
riparian rights, a reserved right can be claimed at any time and 
has a priority superior to all pre-reservation state appropriative 
rights.104
For most of the 20
 
th century, the right remained inchoate, but 
starting in the 1960s it became a source of empowerment for 
tribes.105  During the golden era of reclamation projects (1902-
1963), the states and federal government made sure that Indian 
irrigation projects were funded at a very low rate.106  Congress 
approved some small project appropriations, but they were 
subject to the condition that water rights be acquired under state 
law.  Not surprisingly, the weak Indian Office107
 
exclusive state control of water allocation.  See Cal. Or. Power Co. V. Beaver 
Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 153- 164 (1935). 
 deferred the 
increasingly powerful Reclamation Service’s policy of filing for 
state appropriations. 
 101. See Winters, 207 U.S. 564. 
 102. See id. at 574-78. 
 103. See id. at 576. 
 104. The leading historian of the case contests this reading and argues that 
both the United States Attorney, the trial judge and the Ninth Circuit read the 
1888 Fort Belknap Agreement “to include an explicit reservation of water.”  
John Shurts, NW. Power and Conservation Council, Presentation at Utton 
Transboundary Resource Center Winters Centennial Conference: Winters in 
American History (Jun. 10, 2008). 
 105. See Tarlock, supra note 95. 
 106. See generally LLOYD BURTON, AMERICAN INDIAN WATER RIGHTS AND THE 
LIMITS OF THE LAW (1991); see also ROBERT A. SAUDER, THE YUMA RECLAMATION 
PROJECT: IRRIGATION, INDIAN ALLOTMENT, AND SETTLEMENT ALONG THE LOWER 
COLORADO RIVER (2009). 
 107. See JOHN SHURTS, INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS: THE WINTERS 
DOCTRINE IN ITS SOCIAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT 1880S-1930S 181-222 (2000). 
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Epic litigation between Arizona and California revived 
Winters rights and ultimately empowered tribes to chart a 
sustainable future.  In the course of apportioning the Colorado 
River among Arizona, California, and Nevada, the Supreme 
Court awarded several tribes along the River substantial 
amounts of water based on the “practicable irrigable acreage” of 
the reservation.108  States tried to cabin the standard by the 
inclusion of a cost-benefit standard.  In subsequent litigation over 
the boundaries of the reservations, the Special Master rejected 
the use of a formal cost-benefit analysis, although he did hold 
that economic feasibility was a relevant factor.109  The net result 
was that the tribes were able to assert large inchoate claims to 
water already put to use under state law.110
These claims increased pressure of the federal government to 
find an equitable solution.  In the 1970s, the doctrine evolved into 
a strong reparations doctrine, which legitimized tribal claims.  
The still influential 1973 National Water Commission report laid 
the foundation for subsequent settlements and modifications of 
the doctrine: 
 
Following Winters, more than 50 years elapsed before the 
Supreme Court again discussed significant aspects of Indian 
water rights.  During most of this 50-year period, the United 
States was pursuing a policy of encouraging the settlement of the 
West and the creation of family-sized farms on its arid lands.  In 
retrospect, it can be seen that this policy was pursued with little 
or no regard for Indian water rights and the Winters doctrine.  
With the encouragement, or at least the cooperation, of the 
Secretary of the Interior – the very office entrusted with 
protection of all Indian rights – many large irrigation projects 
 
 108. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963). 
 109. See Report of Special Masters (Feb. 22, 1982), adopted by Arizona v. 
California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983); see also R. G. Cummings et al., The “New” 
Arizona v. California: Practicably Irrigated Acreage and Economic Feasibility, 
22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 517, 517 (1982); Martha C. Franks, The Use of the 
Practicably Irrigated Acreage Standard in the Quantification of Reserved Water 
Rights, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 549, 552 (1991). 
 110. For example, the Navajo Tribe at one time claimed up to 2,000,000 acre 
feet of the Colorado River’s annual flow. See William Douglass Back and Jeffrey 
S. Taylor, Navajo Water Rights: Pulling the Plug on the Colorado River, 20 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 71, 74 (1980). 
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were constructed on streams that flowed through or bordered 
Indian Reservations, sometimes above and more often below the 
Reservations.  With few exceptions the projects were planned and 
built by the Federal Government without attempt to define, let 
alone protect, prior rights that Indian tribes might have had in 
the waters used for the projects.  Before Arizona v. California, 
referred to hereinafter, actions involving Indian water rights 
generally concerned then existing uses by Indians and did not 
involve the full extent of rights under the Winters doctrine.  In 
the history of the United States Government’s treatment of 
Indian tribes, its failure to protect Indian water rights for use on 
the Reservations it set aside for them is one of the sorrier 
chapters.111
After the Report, western states still clung to the “museum 
theory” of Winters.  They argued that reserved rights were limited 
to on reservation irrigation periods.
 
112  This argument 
perpetrated social inquiry because for many tribes practicable 
irrigable acreage was not beneficial.113  Even tribes who wanted 
to irrigate were locked into a 19th
Slowly, some courts came to understand that Winters stood 
for a broader theory of tribal survival as it allowed for the tribe to 
make sustainable choices about the future of the reservation.  
The right is best understood as a right to the amount of water 
necessary to sustain the tribe’s vision of its land base, be it 
environmental preservation, urban water marketing, or irrigated 
agriculture.  An influential Ninth Circuit opinion took the first 
step in this direction and held that a tribe with a limited history 
of irrigation could claim reserved rights for pre-settlement fishing 
and hunting.
 century pastoral vision. 
114
 
 111. NAT’L WATER COMM’N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL REPORT TO 
THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  474-75 (1973). 
  The Arizona Supreme Court took the 
sustainability theory to its logical conclusion.  A game changing 
 112. See, e.g., In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big 
Horn River, 753 P.2d 76, 89 (Wyo. 1988) (describing Wyoming’s adoption of this 
theory regarding limitations to on-reservation irrigation periods). 
 113. Elizabeth Weldon, Practicably Irrigated Acreage Standard: A Poor 
Partner for the West’s Water Future, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 203, 
222 (2000). 
 114. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
467 U.S. 1252 (1983). 
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decision adopted a culturally sensitive standard, the maintenance 
of a tribal homeland, as the measure of the right.115
The important thing is that the lower court should have before it 
actual and proposed uses, accompanied by the parties’ 
recommendations regarding feasibility and the amount of water 
necessary to accomplish the homeland purpose.  In viewing this 
evidence, the lower court should consider the following factors, 
which are not intended to be exclusive.
  The test is 
multi-factor which includes, inter alia: 
116
A tribe’s history will likely be significant.  Deference should 
be given to practices requiring water use that are embedded in 
Native American traditions.  Some rituals may date back 
hundreds of years, and tribes should be granted water rights 
necessary to continue such practices into the future.  An Indian 
reservation could not be a true homeland otherwise. 
 
In addition to history, the court should consider tribal culture 
when quantifying federally reserved rights.  Preservation of 
culture benefits both Indians and non-Indians. 
The court should also consider the tribal land’s geography, 
topography, and natural resources, including groundwater 
availability. 
The homeland standard, if used to actually benefit tribes, is 
an example of an evolved social justice sustainability standard.  
However, legislation will often be required to finance a 
sustainable homeland.  For several decades, Indian tribes have 
benefitted from federal water rights settlements that give them a 
mix of wet water, cash and the ability to lease water for off-
reservation use.  These settlements also include new tribal roles 
in resource management and environmental protection.  For 
example, in 2004, the state of Idaho, the federal government and 
the Nez Perce Tribe entered into a creative settlement that 
provides for a more stable flow regime on Lower Snake River, 
 
 115. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River 
System and Source, 35 P.3d 68, 77 (Ariz. 2001). 
 116. Id. at 318. 
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which can benefit both salmon restoration efforts and hydropower 
generation.117
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
This article has provided examples of three uses of the 
sustainable development label to more closely align water law 
and policy with the goals of the international norm of sustainable 
development.  First, it can be used to spotlight existing laws and 
policies which promote unsustainable uses and thus should be 
reformed.  Second, it can be a positive label to add additional 
support for efforts to promote more efficient, less wasteful, and 
socially inclusive water uses.  Third, it can be a concrete standard 
to constrain unsustainable uses, thus freeing up more water for 
sustainable uses which include more efficient consumption, 
environmental protection, and the promotion of social justice. 
 
 
 117. The settlement will release water that willing state water rights holders 
deposit into water banks. See Ann R. Klee & Duane Mecham, The Nez Perce 
Indian Water Right Settlement- Federal Perspective, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 595, 611- 
618 (2006).  The broader question of the merits of salmon restoration efforts in 
the Columbia-Snake River basin, including the breaching of Snake River dams, 
is beyond the scope of this article. See generally Michael C. Blumm, Erica  J. 
Thorson & Joshua D. Smith, Practiced at the Art of Deception: The Failure of 
Columbia Basin Salmon Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act, 36 ENVTL. 
L. 709 (2006). 
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